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1 Introduction
The industrial revolution marked a dramatic turning point in the economic progress of nations.
During the nineteenth century, a number of technological leaders in the Western Europe and North
America leapt ahead of the rest of the world, while others lagged behind and became colonies or
semi-colonies of the Western powers. After the WWII, most developing countries obtained political
independence and started their industrialization and modernization process. One might expect
that, with the spread of technology and the advantage of backwardness (Gerschenkron (1962)), the
world should have witnessed convergence in income and living standard. Instead, the post WWII
was a period of continued and accelerated divergence (Pritchett (1997)). According to Maddison
(2008), the per capita GDP in the U.S., the most advanced countries in the 20th century, grew at
an average annual growth rate of 2.1% in the period between 1950 and 2008. While some OECD
and East Asian economies were able to narrow the per capita GDP gap with an annual growth rate
higher than that of the U.S. in the catch up process, most other countries in Latin America, Asia,
and Africa failed to achieve so.1
Why some countries fail to converge in growth rates despite the possibility of technology transfer
has been a puzzle. There are several explanations in the literature.2 In this paper we focus on
the explanation of Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (henceforth AHM) (2005) and Acemoglu,
Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) based on a Schumpeterian overlapping-generations (OLG) model of
economic growth with credit constraints.3
[Insert Figure 1 Here.]
We contribute to this literature by analyzing the relationship among growth, inflation, and
financial development. Figure 1 presents the cross-sectional evidence on the sample of 71 countries
over the period 1960-1995.4 Panels A and B show that the average inflation rate is negatively
related to the average per capita GDP growth rate and positively related to the average money
growth rate. Panel C shows that the average inflation rate is negatively related to the average
level of financial development and this relationship vanishes at a high level of financial development
(about 50%). Panel D displays the countries that fail to converge to the world frontier growth rate,
identified by AHM (2005). These countries have a low average level of financial development and
their inflation is negatively related to the average level of financial development.
Motivated by the evidence above, we introduce a monetary authority and a government to
a closed-economy version of the AHM model. We modify this model in several ways. First, we
1In the period of 1950-2008, the average per capita GDP growth rates for the whole Latin America, Asia, and
Africa were respectively 1.8%, 1.6%, and 1.2% (Maddison (2008)).
2See Banerjee and Duflo (2005) for a survey.
3AHM (2005) provide empirical evidence to support the importance of the credit constraints for convergence or
divergence.
4Appendix B presents data description.
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introduce money by assuming money enters utility (Sidrauski (1967)). This money-in-the-utility
approach can be microfounded in several ways once one takes into account the role of medium of
exchange (McCallum (1983)). Although money can be valued in the OLG model as a store of value
(Samuelson (1958)), the equilibrium net nominal interest rate is zero and hence one cannot analyze
monetary policy in terms of interest rate rules. Our modeling of money avoids this issue.5 Second,
we introduce intra-generational heterogeneity so that there are savers and borrowers (entrepreneurs)
in each period. We can then endogenize the nominal interest rate in a credit market and study how
credit market imperfections affect interest rates. Third, we assume savers are risk averse so that
we can derive their consumption and portfolio choices. In each period a young saver must choose
optimal consumption, money holdings, and saving in terms of nominal bonds.
We show that the market equilibrium in our model can be summarized by a system of four
nonlinear difference equations for four sequences of variables: the nominal interest rate, the inflation
rate, the normalized R&D investment, and the proximity to the technological frontier. For this
equilibrium system, monetary policy is modeled by a money supply rule. If one uses an interest
rate rule as in the dynamic new Keynesian literature (Woodford (2003)), then money supply is
endogenous and the nominal interest rate is replaced by the money growth rate in the equilibrium
system. Due to the complexity of our model, we cannot reduce this system to a scalar one for
the proximity variable alone as in the AHM model. However we are still able to provide a full
characterization of the steady state along a balanced growth path, which is consistent with the
evidence presented in Figure 1.
It turns out that how money supply is introduced to the economy is critical for how money
affects the equilibrium allocation and long-run growth. We first show that, if money increments
are transferred to the old agents in an amount proportional to their pre-transfer money holdings,
then money is super-neutral in the sense that monetary policy does not affect long-run growth and
the equilibrium allocation along a balanced growth path.6 This result dates back to Lucas’s (1972)
model, in which there is no endogenous growth. The intuition is that the demand for money and
saving depends on the ratio of the nominal interest rate and the money growth rate and hence the
real interest rate in the long run. Thus only real variables are determined in the steady state.
We show that there are three dynamic patterns as in the AHM model with the difference that
our model incorporates inflation:
1. When the credit market is perfect so that the credit constraint does not bind, the econ-
omy converges to the world frontier growth rate and there is no marginal effect of financial
development.
2. When the credit constraint binds, but is not tight enough, the economy converges to the
5Another approach is to introduce a cash-in-advance constraint.
6Money growth has a short-run effect on the transition path.
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world frontier growth rate with a level effect of financial development.
3. When the credit constraint is sufficiently tight, there is divergence in growth rates with a
growth effect of financial development. In this case the economy enters an equilibrium with
poverty trap.
We prove that the steady states for all these three cases are saddle points. For any given
initial value of the proximity to the frontier, there exists a unique saddle path such that the
economy will transition to the steady state. For the first two cases, the transition paths display the
feature of the advantage of backwardness (Gerschenkron (1962)). Moreover, the inflation rate rises
during the transition. But for the third case, the economy exhibits the feature of the disadvantage
of backwardness and falls into the poverty trap with low economic growth, low innovation, and
high inflation. The inflation rate declines during the transition. Moreover, the long-run rate of
productivity growth increases with financial development and the long-run inflation rate decreases
with financial development.
Next we study efficient allocation. Suppose that there is a social planner who maximizes the
sum of discounted utilities of all agents in the present and future generations. We derive the
efficient allocation and long-run growth rate. By comparing with the efficient allocation, we find
there are four sources of inefficiency in a market equilibrium. First, there is monopoly inefficiency
in the production of intermediate goods. The resulting price distortion generates an inefficiently
low level of final net output when taken the innovation rate as given. Second, the private return to
innovation ignores the dynamic externality or spillover effect of technology. Third, the credit market
imperfection prevents innovators to obtain necessary funds for R&D. Finally, the OLG framework
itself may cause dynamic inefficiency and inefficient within generation consumption allocation.
Can a combination of monetary and fiscal policies correct the preceding inefficiencies and make
the market equilibrium attain the efficient allocation? We show that when money increments
are transferred to the entrepreneur, money is not super-neutral and there is a particular nominal
interest rate such that the market equilibrium can achieve innovation efficiency, but it cannot
achieve output and consumption efficiency. The intuition is that money growth is like an inflation
tax and there is a wealth effect when the tax is not proportionally distributed to the agents according
to their pre-transfer money holdings. Money affects the real economy through the redistribution
channel. We then introduce fiscal policies to attain the efficient allocation. We find different
policies are needed in different development stages. When the economy faces severe credit market
imperfections, the government should try to loosen credit constraints by ensuring better contract
enforcements or better monitoring of borrowers. For example, the government can make direct
lending to entrepreneurs financed by lump-sum taxes on savers. When the government has better
monitoring technologies than private agents, the credit constraints can be overcome. The economy
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can then avoid the equilibrium with poverty traps.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it is related to the literature on
poverty traps and convergence or divergence in economies with credit market imperfections (e.g.,
Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Howitt (2000), Mookherjee and Ray (2001),
Azariadis and Stachurski (2005), Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-
Foulkes (2005) and Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006)). As pointed out by Azariadis and
Stachurski (2005) in their survey, this literature typically studies models of self-reinforcing mecha-
nisms that cause poverty to persist. In these models there is no technical progress and therefore no
positive long-run growth. As discussed earlier, our paper is most closely related to Aghion, Howitt,
and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006), which incorporate long-run
growth. Unlike these two papers, we introduce money, endogenize interest rates, and provide a
policy analysis. Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) also derive three convergence patterns analogous
to those in our paper, but the disadvantage of backwardness that prevents convergence in that
paper arises from low levels of human capital rather than from credit-market imperfections.
Second, our paper is related to the literature that analyzes the effects of financial constraints or
financial intermediation on long-run growth. Early contributions include Greenwood and Jovanovic
(1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), and King and Levine (1993). None of these papers studies
technology transfer and the associated policy issues which are our focus.
Third, our paper is related to the literature on the relation between money and growth. Recent
papers include Gomme (1991), Marquis and Reffett (1994), Chu and Cozzi (2014), Jones and
Manuelli (1995), Miao and Xie (2013), and Chu et al. (2017), among others. These papers typically
introduce money via cash-in-advance constraints in infinite-horizon models, which do not feature
poverty traps. By contrast, we follow the money-in-the-utility function approach of McCallum
(1983) and Abel (1987) in the OLG framework. Our focus is on how monetary and fiscal policies
can attain efficient allocation and avoid poverty traps.
2 The Model
We consider a monetary overlapping generations model of a closed economy based on Aghion,
Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006). Time is discrete
and runs forever. Time is denoted by t = 1, 2, . . . . Each generation has a unit measure of identical
entrepreneurs and a unit measure of identical savers. Each agent lives for two periods. Only
entrepreneurs can conduct innovation, but they face borrowing constraints. Savers lend funds to
entrepreneurs, but they cannot innovate. As a benchmark, we follow Lucas (1972) and assume that
the government (or central bank) directly transfers money to all agents and the monetary transfer
is proportional to each agent’s pre-transfer money holdings.
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2.1 Production
All agents work for the producers who combine labor and a continuum of specialized intermediate
goods to produce a general good according to the production function,
Zt = L
1−α
t
∫ 1
0
At (i)
1−α xt (i)α di, (1)
where Lt is labor demand, xt (i) is the input of the latest version of intermediate good i, and At (i)
is the productivity parameter associated with it. The general good is used for consumption, as an
input to R&D and also as an input to the production of intermediate goods. The general good is
produced under perfect competition. Suppose that the aggregate labor supply is normalized to one
and the real price of the general good is also normalized to one. Then the equilibrium real price of
each intermediate good equals its marginal product:
pt (i) = α
(
xt (i)
At (i)
)α−1
. (2)
For each intermediate good i there is one entrepreneur born each period t who is capable of
producing an innovation for the next period. If he succeeds in innovating, then he will be the ith
incumbent in period t + 1. Let µt (i) be the probability that he succeeds. Then the technology
evolves according to
At+1 (i) =
{
A¯t+1 with probability µt (i)
At (i) with probability 1− µt (i) ,
where A¯t+1 is the world frontier technology, which grows at the exogenously given constant rate
g > 0. That a successful innovator gets to implement A¯t+1 is a manifestation of technology transfer
in the sense that domestic R&D makes use of ideas developed elsewhere in the world. If an
innovation fails, the intermediate good sector i uses the technology in the previous period.
In each intermediate good sector where an innovation has just occurred, the incumbent can
produce one unit of the intermediate good using one unit of the general good as the only input.
In each intermediate sector there are an unlimited number of people capable of producing copies
of the latest generation of that intermediate good at a unit cost of χ > 1. The fact that χ > 1
implies that the fringe is less productive than the incumbent producer. The parameter χ captures
technological factors as well as government regulation affecting entry. A higher χ corresponds to
a less competitive market. So in sectors where an innovation has just occurred, the incumbent
will be the sole producer, at a price equal to the unit cost of the competitive fringe, whereas in
noninnovating sectors where the most recent incumbent is dead, production will take place under
perfect competition with a price equal to the unit cost of each producer. In either event the price
will be χ, and according to the demand function (2) the quantity demanded will be
xt (i) =
(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
At (i) . (3)
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It follows that an unsuccessful innovator will earn zero profits next period, whereas the real
profit of a successful incumbent will be
Ψt (i) = pt (i)xt (i)− xt (i) = (χ− 1)
(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
A¯t ≡ ψA¯t,
where ψ represents the normalized profit:
ψ = (χ− 1)
(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
.
2.2 Entrepreneurs
An entrepreneur born in period t ≥ 1 is endowed with λ ∈ (0, 1) units of labor when young and
supplies labor inelasically to the general good producers. He derives utility from consumption cet+1
when old according to
β log
(
Etc
e
t+1
)
,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor. This utility function is an increasing transfor-
mation of a risk-neutral utility function. We will see the role of the log transformation in Section
4.
An innovation costs Nt units of general good in period t, which represents R&D investment. The
young entrepreneur receives labor income λwt, which may not be sufficient to cover the innovation
cost Nt. Suppose that the entrepreneur borrows Bt dollars at the nominal interest rate Rft between
periods t and t+ 1 from the savers so that
Nt =
Bt
Pt
+ λwt, (4)
where Pt denotes the price level and wt is the real wage rate.
We follow Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty (1999) and Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005)
to model financial market imperfections. Suppose that the entrepreneur can hide a successful
innovation at a real cost κNt so that he can avoid repaying debt. The parameter κ ∈ (0, 1)
reflects the degree of financial development. A higher value of κ means that it is more costly for
the entrepreneur to misbehave. It measures the degree of creditor protection. To implement the
contract without default, the entrepreneur faces an incentive constraint
β
(
µtψA¯t+1 −Rft Bt
Pt+1
)
≥ βµtψA¯t+1 − κNt,
where the expression on the left-hand side of the inequality is the discounted expected consumption
if the entrepreneur behaves and the expression on the right-hand side is the discounted expected
consumption if he is dishonest. Simplifying yields the borrowing constraint
Bt
Pt
≤ κNt
βRft/Πt+1
, (5)
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where Πt+1 = Pt+1/Pt denotes the inflation rate. By (4) this constraint is equivalent to
Nt ≤ βRft/Πt+1
βRft/Πt+1 − κλwt (6)
for βRft/Πt+1 > κ. Thus R&D investment is limited by a multiple of the entrepreneur’s net worth
λwt. This multiple is called the credit multiplier by AHM and increases with κ, but decreases with
the real interest rate.
Suppose that
Nt = Φ(µt)A¯t+1,
where the function Φ is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies Φ(0) = 0 and Φ′ > 0 and
Φ
′′
> 0. The factor A¯t+1 reflects the “fishing-out” effect: the further ahead the frontier moves, the
more difficult it is to innovate. This effect is important to have a balanced growth path. We can
also rewrite the preceding equation as
µt = F
(
Nt/A¯t+1
)
, (7)
where F = Φ−1 satisfies F (0) = 0, F ′ > 0, and F ′′ < 0.
The entrepreneur’s expected consumption is given by
Etc
e
t+1 = µtψA¯t+1 −
RftBt
Pt+1
= F
(
Nt
A¯t+1
)
ψA¯t+1 − RftPt
Pt+1
(Nt − λwt) .
The entrepreneur’s objective is to solve the following problem
max
Nt
F
(
Nt/A¯t+1
)
ψA¯t+1 − RftPt
Pt+1
(Nt − λwt)
subject to (6). When the credit constraint (6) does not bind, the first-order condition is given by
F ′
(
Nt
A¯t+1
)
ψ =
Rft
Πt+1
, (8)
where Πt+1 = Pt+1/Pt denotes the inflation rate. This condition says that the expected marginal
return to R&D is equal to the real interest rate.
The initial old entrepreneur at time t does not have labor income and hence does not conduct
innovation. We assume that he simply consumes his money endowment M e0 and the government
proportional transfer M e0z1.
2.3 Savers
A saver born at time t ≥ 1 is endowed with 1 − λ units of labor when young and supplies labor
inelastically to the general good producers. He has the utility function
log(cyt ) + β log(c
o
t+1) + γ log (Mt/Pt) , γ > 0,
8
where β is the discount factor, cyt (c
o
t+1) denotes consumption at time t (t + 1) when the saver
is young (old), Mt denotes money holdings chosen in period t. He faces the following budget
constraints
cyt +
St
Pt
+
Mt
Pt
= (1− λ)wt,
cot+1 =
StRft
Pt+1
+
Mt (1 + zt+1)
Pt+1
,
where St denotes saving and zt+1 ≥ 0 denotes the proportional rate of the monetary transfer from
the government. Note that the above utility specification does not have a satiation level of real
balances as in Friedman (1969).
The first-order conditions give
1
cyt
= β
1
cot+1
Pt
Pt+1
Rft,
and
1
cyt
=
γ
Mt/Pt
+
β
cot+1
Pt(1 + zt+1)
Pt+1
.
Using these conditions and the budget constraints, we can derive that
cyt =
(1− λ)wt
1 + β + γ
, (9)
Mt
Pt
=
γ(1− λ)wt
1 + β + γ
1
1− (1 + zt+1) /Rft , (10)
St
Pt
=
(1− λ)wt
1 + β + γ
[
β − γ
Rft/ (1 + zt+1)− 1
]
. (11)
Thus, consumption, the money demand, and the saving demand are all proportional to the saver’s
real wealth (1− λ)wt. Moreover the money demand decreases with Rft/ (1 + zt+1) and the saving
demand increases with Rft/ (1 + zt+1) . This property is important for the long-run super-neutrality
of money because Rft/ (1 + zt+1) is proportional to the real interest rate in the steady state, which
is independent of the inflation rate.
We assume that
Rft > (1 + zt+1)
(
1 +
γ
β
)
. (12)
This assumption ensures that the money demand Mt/Pt > 0 and the saving demand St/Pt > 0.
The initial old saver is endowed with money holdings M s0 and derives utility according log (c
o
1) ,
where
co1 =
M s0 (1 + z1)
P1
.
2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
Define the aggregate technology as
At =
∫
At (i) di.
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In equilibrium the probability of innovation will be the same in each sector: µt (i) = µt for all i.
Thus average productivity evolves according to
At+1 = µtA¯t+1 + (1− µt)At. (13)
Define the normalized productivity as at = At/A¯t. Normalized productivity is an inverse measure of
the country’s distance to the technological frontier, or its technology gap. It describes the proximity
to the technological frontier and satisfies the dynamics
at+1 = µt +
1− µt
1 + g
at. (14)
Equation (13) implies that
At+1 −At
At
= µt
(
1 + g
at
− 1
)
.
Thus there is an advantage of backwardness (Gerschenkron (1962)) in the sense that the further
the country is behind the frontier, the faster the country grows (a smaller at cause higher growth).
On the other hand, the country’s growth rate also depends on innovation µt. More innovation
allows more firms to adopt the frontier technology and hence enhancing growth. Thus the net
effect depends on both at and µt. Here µt or R&D investment is like the role of human capital that
determines a country’s “absorptive capacity” (Nelson and Phelps (1966)).
In equilibrium Lt = 1. We then use (1), (2), and pt (i) = χ to derive aggregate output of the
general good
Zt = ζAt, where ζ ≡
(
α
χ
) α
1−α
.
The wage rate is given by
wt = (1− α)Zt = (1− α) ζAt. (15)
The equilibrium interest rate Rft and the price level Pt are determined by the market-clearing
conditions for credit and money: Bt = St and Mt = (1 + zt)Mt−1 for t ≥ 1, where zt is the money
growth rate controlled by the central bank and M0 = M
s
0 +M
e
0 is given.
By (4), (11), and the market-clearing condition Bt = St, we have
Nt − λwt = (1− λ)wt
1 + β + γ
[
β − γ(1 + zt+1)
Rft − (1 + zt+1)
]
. (16)
Value added in the general sector is wage income, whereas value added in the intermediate
sectors is profit income. Total GDP is the sum of value added in all sectors:
Yt = wt + µt−1ψA¯t = (1− α) ζAt + µt−1ψA¯t. (17)
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3 Equilibrium Balanced Growth Paths
In this section we solve for competitive equilibrium and derive equilibrium balanced growth path
and local dynamics.
3.1 Perfect Credit Markets
Suppose that the credit constraint (6) does not bind so that the credit market is perfect. It follows
from (8) that the optimal innovation is determined by the condition
F ′(nt)ψ =
Rft
Πt+1
, (18)
where we define nt = Nt/A¯t+1. We can rewrite (14) as
at+1 = F (nt) +
1− F (nt)
1 + g
at. (19)
Conjecture that the economy will grow at the rate of the world technology frontier along a
balanced growth path so that At+1 = (1 + g)At. Using (10) to compute the ratio Mt+1/Mt and
then imposing the money market-clearing condition Mt+1 = Mt (1 + zt+1), we obtain
(1 + zt+1)
Pt
Pt+1
=
Mt+1/Pt+1
Mt/Pt
=
wt+1 [1− (1 + zt+1) /Rft]
wt [1− (1 + zt+2) /Rft+1] .
Using (15), at = At/A¯t, and At+1 = (1 + g)At, we simplify the preceding equation as
Πt+1 = (1 + zt+1)
1− (1 + zt+2) /Rft+1
1− (1 + zt+1) /Rft
at
at+1 (1 + g)
. (20)
Thus the inflation rate is determined by money demand and money supply, which in turn are
determined by the nominal interest rate, the growth rate of domestic productivity, and the growth
rate of money supply. Using nt = Nt/A¯t+1, (15), and (16), we derive that
nt =
(1− α) ζat
1 + g
[
λ+
(1− λ)
1 + β + γ
(
β − γ(1 + zt+1)
Rft − (1 + zt+1)
)]
. (21)
Now the competitive equilibrium under perfect credit markets can be summarized by a system of
four difference equations (18), (19), (20), and (21) for four sequences {Rft}, {at} , {Πt+1}, and {nt}
such that (12) and (6) are satisfied, given an exogenous sequence of money growth rates {zt}. The
endogenous predetermined variable is at and other equilibrium variables are non-predetermined.
We introduce the following conditions to ensure the existence of the steady-state innovation
rate µ ∈ (0, 1) :
Φ′ (0) <
ψ
1 + g
1 + γβ − [ Φ′(0)g(1−α)ζ − λ] 1+β+γ1−λ

−1
, (22)
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and
Φ′ (1) >
ψ
1 + g
1 + γβ − [Φ(1)(g+1)(1−α)ζ − λ] 1+β+γ1−λ

−1
. (23)
The following result characterizes the steady state and local dynamics around the steady state. We
relegate its proof and the proofs of all other results to the appendix.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the monetary transfer is given to the old generation only in a quantity
proportional to the pre-transfer money holdings of each. Let conditions (22) and (23) hold. There
exists a cutoff κ∗ such that, if κ ≥ κ∗, then the credit constraint does not bind. Moreover there
exists a unique steady state {µ∗, n∗, R∗f , a∗,Π∗} with µ∗, a∗ ∈ (0, 1) , n∗ > 0, Π∗ = (1 + z) / (1 + g)
and the productivity grows at the rate g. In this steady state money is super-neutral in the sense that
the steady-state real quantities are independent of money growth rate z. They are also independent
of κ. If furthermore
gn∗F ′(n∗)
F (n∗)
< g + F (n∗) , (24)
then the steady state is a saddle point and the local equilibrium around the steady state is unique.
In a neighborhood of the steady state given a1 < a
∗ and zt = z for all t ≥ 1, at, nt, µt, and Πt all
increase monotonically to the steady state, but At+1/At and Rft/Πt+1 decrease monotonically to
the steady state.
Proposition 1 states that, if the level of financial development κ is sufficiently high, the credit
constraint does not bind. There is a balanced growth path along which output and the productivity
grow at the rate g. The inflation rate is constant over time and increases with the money growth
rate 1 + z proportionally and decreases with the productivity growth rate 1 + g proportionally. All
steady-state values are independent of the level of financial development. Since µ∗ ∈ (0, 1) , the
economy can never reach the world technology frontier in that a∗ ∈ (0, 1) . For the economy to
reach the frontier, we must have condition (23) hold with equality so that µ∗ = a∗ = 1. This case
can happen when innovation profits are sufficiently high, i.e., ψ is sufficiently large.
Proposition 1 also characterizes the local dynamics of the equilibrium system of equations (18),
(19), (20), and (21). For simplicity let the exogenous money growth rate zt = z be constant
over time. We impose a technical condition (24), which can be verified in numerical examples
and is easily satisfied for small g. When the initial value a1 is slightly below the steady state
value a∗, Proposition 1 shows that there exist unique initial values Rf1, Π1, and n1 such that
{at, Rft,Πt+1, nt}∞t=1 will converge to the steady state along a saddle path. In particular, at, nt,
µt, and Πt all increase monotonically to the steady state, but At+1/At and Rft/Πt+1 decrease
monotonically to the steady state.
[Insert Figure 2 Here.]
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We use a numerical example to illustrate the transition dynamics. As in AHM (2006), we set
Φ (µ) = φµ + δ2µ
2 and F (n) = 1δ
(√
2nδ + φ2 − φ
)
. We choose parameter values as α = 0.8,
χ = 1.15, φ = 0.0134, δ = 0.2604, λ = 0.01, g = 0.04, β = 0.96, and γ = 0.017. Assume that
money supply grows at a constant rate z = 0.06. Our simple two-period lived OLG model cannot
be calibrated to confront with data. We use our numerical example to illustrate the working of our
model. We find that the critical value κ∗ = 0.678. We choose an arbitrary κ > κ∗. Then the steady
state values are given by R∗f = 1.08, Π
∗ = 1.0192, a∗ = 0.5, µ∗ = 0.037, n∗ = 0.0007. Moreover,
the GDP Yt normalized by A¯t is equal to 0.024. The steady state is a saddle point. Only at is a
predetermined variable. Figure 2 illustrates the transition dynamics for the case of perfect credit
markets when the economy starts at a1 = 0.3. We find that µt, at, and Πt gradually increase
to their steady-state values, but Rft decreases to its steady state value. Given that we take the
money growth rate fixed, the inflation rate moves inversely with the growth rate of productivity.
The transition path illustrates the advantage of backwardness. When the economy initially falls
behind the world frontier, both its technology and innovation grow faster. Thus its GDP also grows
faster. They eventually catch up with the growth rate of the world frontier.
Notice that the steady-state proximity to frontier a∗ depends on the preference and technology
parameters. A crucial parameter is the marginal cost of innovation φ given the quadratic specifi-
cation of Φ. A higher φ raises the marginal cost and reduces the marginal benefit by reducing the
real interest rate, thereby reducing the innovation rate µ∗. This causes the economy’s absorptive
capacity to be smaller so that a∗ is smaller.
3.2 Binding Credit Constraints
Suppose that the credit constraint (6) binds. Using (16) and (6) we obtain
wt
{
λ+
(1− λ)
1 + β + γ
[
β − γ(1 + zt+1)
Rft − (1 + zt+1)
]}
=
βRft/Πt+1
βRft/Πt+1 − κλwt. (25)
We also require that
F ′ (nt)ψ >
Rft
Πt+1
, (26)
which ensures (6) indeed binds in the entrepreneur’s optimization problem by the complementary
slackness condition. Now the equilibrium system consists of equations (19), (20), (21), and (25) for
four sequences {Rft}, {at} , {Πt+1}, and {nt} such that (12) and (26) hold. The following result
characterizes the steady state and the local dynamics.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the monetary transfer is given to the old generation only in a quantity
proportional to the pre-transfer money holdings of each. There exist cutoffs κ∗∗ and κ¯ such that,
if κ∗∗ < κ < min {κ∗, κ¯} , then the credit constraint binds and there exists a unique steady state
{µ∗∗, n∗∗, R∗∗f , a∗∗,Π∗∗} such that µ∗∗, a∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) , 0 < n∗∗ < n∗, Π∗∗ = (1 + z) / (1 + g) , R∗∗f <
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R∗f , and the net productivity growth rate is g. Moreover, money is super-neutral, and n
∗∗, µ∗∗, and
R∗∗f increase with κ. If in addition
gn∗∗F ′(n∗∗)
F (n∗∗)
< g + F (n∗∗) , (27)
then the steady state is a saddle point and the local equilibrium around the steady state is unique.
In a neighborhood of the steady state given a1 < a
∗∗ and zt = z for all t, at, nt, µt, Rft, and Πt
all increase monotonically to the steady state, but At+1/At and Rft/Πt+1 decrease monotonically
to the steady state.
We use Figure 3 to illustrate the determination of the steady-state nominal interest rate pre-
sented in Propositions 1 and 2. The curve labeled “Supply” describes the supply of funds for R&D
investment normalized by the wage rate, which is given by the expression on the left-hand side of
equation (25) without the time subscripts:
Nt
wt
= λ+
(1− λ)
1 + β + γ
[
β − γ(1 + z)
Rf − (1 + z)
]
. (supply)
The supply is equal to the sum of the entrepreneur’s wage and the savers’ saving. This curve
increases with the nominal interest rate Rf . The curve labeled “Demand” describes the steady-
state demand for funds normalized by the wage rate, when the credit constraint does not bind. To
derive the demand function, we show that
Nt
wt
=
Nt
(1− α) ζAt =
n
(1− α) ζa/ (1 + g) =
n
(1−α)ζF (n)
g+F (n)
, (demand)
where the first equality follows from (15), the second from the normalization by A¯t+1 and A¯t+1/A¯t =
1 + g, and the last from the substitution of a using the steady-state version of equation (19). Using
the steady-state version of (18) to substitute for n into the above equation, we obtain the demand
for funds as a function of Rf . We can show that this demand function decreases with Rf .
[Insert Figure 3 Here.]
The curves labeled “Limit κ > κ∗” and “Limit κ < κ∗” describe the borrowing limits normalized
by the wage rate for κ > κ∗ and κ < κ∗, respectively, which are given by the expression on the
right-hand side of the steady-state version of equation (25)
Nt
wt
=
βRf/Π
βRf/Π− κλ =
βRf (1 + g) / (1 + z)
βRf (1 + g) / (1 + z)− κλ. (limit)
This expression decreases with Rf .
When κ > κ∗, the equilibrium nominal interest rate R∗f is determined by the intersection of the
demand curve and the supply curve. In this case the credit constraint does not bind and a change
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in κ does not affect equilibrium as shown in Proposition 1. When κ < κ∗, the credit constraint
binds so that the equilibrium nominal interest rate R∗∗f is determined by the intersection of the
supply curve and the borrowing limit curve. From the figure we can see that R∗∗f < R
∗
f and an
increase in κ raises R∗∗f . Moreover the change in κ has a level effect because n
∗∗ and µ∗∗ increase
with κ. However the change in κ does not have a growth effect in that the steady-state productivity
growth rate is equal to 1 + g.
Proposition 2 also shows that the steady state is a saddle point as in Proposition 1. When the
initial value a1 is slightly below the steady state value a
∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) , there exist unique initial values
Rf1, Π1, µ1, and n1 such that {at, µt, Rft,Πt+1, nt}∞t=1 will converge to the steady state along a
saddle path. In particular, at, nt, µt, and Πt all increase monotonically to the steady state, but
At+1/At and Rft/Πt+1 decrease monotonically to the steady state.
For a numerical illustration, we choose the same parameter values as in Section 3.1 except that
we set κ = 0.5. Then the credit constraint binds. We find the steady-state values R∗∗f = 1.0796,
Π∗∗ = 1.0192, a∗∗ = 0.327, µ∗∗ = 0.018, and n∗∗ = 0.0003. The normalized GDP is equal to 0.016.
Compared to the case of perfect credit markets, credit market imperfections enlarge the distance to
the frontier even though the long-run grow rates are the same, in that a∗∗ < a∗, µ∗∗ < µ∗, n∗∗ < n∗,
and normalized GDP are all smaller. We find that the steady state is also a saddle point. Figure
4 illustrates the transition dynamics, which also display the advantage of backwardness.
[Insert Figure 4 Here.]
3.3 Poverty Trap
When the level of financial development is sufficiently low such that 0 < κ < κ∗∗, the credit
constraint is too tight so that the economy cannot support a sufficient amount of R&D investment
relative to the long-run productivity growth. As a result, the economy enters a poverty trap in
which the R&D investment relative to productivity growth approaches zero so that the steady state
along a balanced growth path satisfies np = µp = 0. In the poverty trap steady state the economy
still grows but at a rate lower than the technology frontier g. Thus the distance to the frontier
approaches zero, ap = 0. The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the monetary transfer is given to the old generation only in a quantity
proportional to the pre-transfer money holdings of each. If 0 < κ < κ∗∗, then there exists a unique
steady-state equilibrium with the inflation rate and nominal interest rate, denoted by Πp and Rpf .
The economy enters the poverty trap with steady-state values µp = ap = np = 0. Money is super-
neutral. The steady-state productivity growth rate is given by
lim
t→∞
At+1
At
= F ′ (0)
(1− α) ζλβRpf/Πp
βRpf/Π
p − κ + 1,
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which is between 0 and 1+g and increases with κ ∈ (0, κ∗∗) . The steady-state inflation rate satisfies Πp >
(1 + z) / (1 + g) and decreases with κ ∈ (0, κ∗∗) . The poverty trap steady state is a saddle point and
the local equilibrium around this steady state is unique. In a neighborhood of the steady state given
a1 > 0 and zt = z for all t, at, Rft, Πt+1, µt, and nt decrease monotonically to the steady state, but
At+1/At and Rft/Πt+1 increase monotonically to the steady state.
It is interesting to compare Propositions 2 and 3. When the credit constraint is not too tight, at
converges to a positive steady state value a∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) . The productivity growth At+1/At converges
to 1 + g and the inflation rate Πt converges to (1 + z) / (1 + g) by (20). By contrast, when the
credit constraint is too tight, at converges to zero. We need to use L’Hospital’s rule to derive the
steady-state productivity growth rate
lim
t→∞
At+1
At
= (1 + g) lim
t→∞
at+1
at
.
We show that this limit is less than 1 + g. Similarly we also use this equation to compute the
steady-state inflation rate Πp by (20), which is higher than (1 + z) / (1 + g). Unlike in the case
with not too tight credit constraints, there is a steady-state growth effect when the level κ ∈ (0, κ∗∗)
of financial development changes.
The transition dynamics are also different, even though both steady states are saddle points.
When the credit constraint is not too tight, at increases monotonically to the steady state when its
initial value a1 is slightly below the steady state a
∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) . As the economy moves closer to the
technological frontier, its productivity growth slows down and gradually decreases to the steady
state. By contrast, when the credit constraint is too tight, the economy will fall into the poverty
trap with ap = 0 starting from any small positive initial value a1 > 0. The innovation rate and
R&D investment also decrease to the steady state. As the economy falls farther away from the
technological frontier, its productivity growth will be faster and increase to the steady state, which
is lower than the frontier growth rate 1 + g.
[Insert Figure 5 Here.]
To illustrate Proposition 3 numerically, we use the same parameter values as in Section 3.1
except that we set κ = 0.1. We then find the poverty trap equilibrium with the steady-state values
Rpf = 1.0792 and Π
p = 1.0205. In the steady state, the normalized GDP is equal to 0 and the
technology growth rate is 1.0387. The steady-state inflation rate is higher than the two cases
studied in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. We also find the poverty-trap steady state is a saddle point.
Figure 5 illustrates the transition dynamics when the economy starts at a1 = 0.5. It shows that
the economy falls further behind the technological frontier. Both at and µt decrease to zero. The
inflation rate Πt and the nominal interest rate Rft also decrease to their steady-state values, but
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the real interest rate Rft/Πt+1 increases to its steady-state value. The growth rate of productivity
increases to a level lower than the technological frontier. The economy falls into a poverty trap
with low economic growth and high inflation. Thus there is a disadvantage of backwardness when
the level financial development is extremely low.
4 Efficient Allocation
In this section we study efficient allocation. Following Abel (1987), suppose that a social planner
maximizes the sum of discounted utility of all agents in the economy
ωu (ce1) + u (c
o
1) +
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
[
u (cyt ) + βu
(
cot+1
)
+ ωβu
(
cet+1
)]
(28)
=
∞∑
t=1
βt−1 [u (cyt ) + u (c
o
t ) + ωu (c
e
t )] ,
where the planner assigns the utility weight ω to the entrepreneur and discounts utilities of future
generations by β. Here we set u (c) = log (c) . As in the dynamic new Keynesian framework, we
consider a cashless limit and ignore money in the utility (Woodford (2003) and Gali (2008)). The
resource constraint is given by
cyt + c
o
t + c
e
t +Nt = L
1−α
t
∫ 1
0
At (i)
1−α xt (i)α di−
∫
χt(i)xt (i) di, (29)
where χt(i) = 1, when an innovation occurs in sector i, and χt(i) = χ, otherwise.
Maximizing the expressions on the right-hand side of equation (29) yields the efficient labor
input Lt = 1 and the efficient intermediate goods input
xt (i) =
 α
1
1−αAt (i) if an innovation occurs(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
At (i) otherwise
. (30)
We can then compute the GDP (net output):
Y et =
∫ 1
0
At (i)
1−α xt (i)α di−
∫
χt(i)xt (i) di
=
(
1
α
− 1
)[
α
1
1−αµt−1A¯t + (1− µt−1)
(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
χAt−1
]
. (31)
The resource constraint (29) becomes
cyt + c
o
t + c
e
t +Nt = Y
e
t . (32)
where µ0 = 0 and A0 is exogenously given.
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Now the planner’s problem is to maximize (28) subject to (7), (13), and (32). By the first-order
conditions we can immediately derive that
cet = ωc
y
t = ωc
o
t . (33)
Since A¯t+1/A¯t = 1 + g, we conjecture that, on the efficient balanced growth path, at = At/A¯t, µt,
and Nt/A¯t+1 = nt are constant over time, but c
y
t , c
o
t , and c
e
t all grow at the rate g. In the appendix
we show that the efficient steady-state innovation rate µ is determined by the following equation
Φ′ (µ) =
β
1 + g
(
1
α
− 1)
[
α
1
1−α −
(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
χ
]
(34)
+
β
1 + g − β(1− µ)(
1
α
− 1)
(
α
χ
) 1
1−α χg
g + µ
.
The expression on the left-hand side of the equation represents the marginal cost of innovation and
the expression on the right-hand side represents the associated present value of marginal benefit.
We can easily check that the marginal cost is an increasing function of µ and the marginal benefit
is a decreasing function of µ. Given the following assumption, there is a unique solution by the
intermediate value theorem, denoted by µFB ∈ (0, 1) , to the above equation.
Assumption 1 The parameter values satisfy
Φ′(0) <
β
1 + g
(
1
α
− 1
)[
α
1
1−α −
(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
χ
]
+
β
1 + g − β
(
1
α
− 1
)(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
χ,
and
Φ′(1) > β
1
1 + g
(
1
α
− 1
)[
α
1
1−α −
(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
χ
]
+
β
1 + g
(
1
α
− 1
)(
α
χ
) 1
1−α χg
g + 1
.
We then obtain the efficient innovation rate µFB, the efficient normalized R&D investment
nFB = Φ (µFB) , and the efficient proximity to the frontier aFB. Moreover, the implied real interest
rate is given by
RrFB =
u′ (cyt )
βu′
(
cot+1
) = 1 + g
β
. (35)
We summarize the preceding analysis below.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique efficient allocation with µFB ∈ (0, 1) ,
aFB ∈ (0, 1) , and nFB > 0 along the balanced growth path with the productivity growth rate being
g.7 Moreover µFB is independent of ω.
7In the knife-edge case where the second inequality in Assumption 1 holds as an equality, the efficient innovation
rate µFB = 1. In this case aFB = 1 and the economy reaches the world frontier technology level.
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By the analysis in the previous section, we can immediately see that competitive equilibrium
allocation is generally not efficient. There are four sources of inefficiency in the market economy
studied in Sections 2 and 3. First, there is monopoly inefficiency in the production of interme-
diate goods. The resulting price distortion generates an inefficiently low level of final net output
when taken the innovation rate as given. Second, entrepreneurs face credit constraints, which dis-
torts innovation investments and within generation consumption allocation. Third, innovators are
monopolists. Private innovation does not take into account of the externality effect on future pro-
ductivity. When choosing innovation investment, entrepreneurs only maximize expected monopoly
profits in the next period. Efficient innovation not only causes profits in the next period to rise, but
also causes future productivity to rise, which raises future profits. Fourth, there is intertemporal
inefficiency in the sense that the equilibrium real interest rate and the implied efficient rate may
be different.
In general the market equilibrium innovation may be either higher or lower than the efficient
innovation depending on the parameter values. To see this fact we consider the case with a perfect
credit market. The equilibrium innovation is determined by equation (18), which can be written
as the steady-state form:
Φ′ (µ∗) =
ψ
R∗f/Π∗
.
Comparing this equation with the efficient condition (34), we can see clearly how the market
equilibrium generates inefficiency.8 First, the market real interest rate R∗f/Π may not be equal
to the efficient rate RrFB = (1 + g) /β. Second, the private return to innovation (the normalized
monopoly profit) ψ may not be equal to the one-period social return described by the expression
(excluding β/ (1 + g)) on the first line of equation (34). Third, the positive externality effect
captured by the expression on the second line does not appear in the above equilibrium condition.
In fact we can show that the private return to innovation ψ is smaller than the one-period
social return and hence smaller than the total social return.9 But the market real interest rate may
be either higher or lower than the efficient rate RrFB. When γ is sufficiently large, savers have a
sufficiently large preference for money so that his saving is sufficiently low. In this case the market
real interest can be higher than the efficient rate and hence the market equilibrium innovation is
lower than the efficient level.
8Notice that F ′ (n) = 1/Φ′ (µ) .
9We need to prove that
ψ = (χ− 1)
(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
< (
1
α
− 1)
[
α
1
1−α −
(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
χ
]
.
This inequality is equivalent to
α
1− α <
χ
(
χ
α
1−α − 1
)
χ− 1 .
The expression on the right-hand side is equal to α/ (1− α) when χ = 1 and increases with χ > 1.
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Using the parameter values in Section 3.1, we computer the efficient steady-state values: aFB =
0.858, µFB = 0.1886, and nFB = 0.0072. The normalized GDP is 0.047. The implied real interest
rate is 1.0833. Even though the implied real interest rate is higher than the market real interest
rate, it turns out that the market equilibrium gives low levels of innovation and GDP.
5 Monetary and Fiscal Policies
In this section we study monetary and fiscal polices under which a competitive equilibrium can
achieve the efficient allocation along the balanced growth path derived in the previous section. For
simplicity we set ω = 1. Our analysis can be similarly applied to other values of ω. In Sections
2 and 3 we have shown that monetary policy is super-neutral if money is transferred to savers in
an amount proportional to their pre-transfer holdings and entrepreneurs do not hold any money.
In this section we relax this assumption. Since entrepreneurs face credit constraints, we naturally
assume that the government transfers money increments to young entrepreneurs in a lump-sum
manner. Then monetary policy is not super-neutral.
5.1 Perfect Credit Market
We first study the case where the credit market is perfect so that the credit constraint is slack. We
consider the following policy tools such that the government’s budget balances in each period t.
For simplicity we do not consider government spending and government debt.
• The central bank sets a constant nominal interest rate Rf and transfers the money increments
τet to the old entrepreneur.
• The government subsidizes the production of the final good by imposing a tax credit 1−τxt (i)
on the intermediate input.
• The government subsidizes the old entrepreneur’s expected profits from innovation at the
constant rate τN .
• The government levies a lump-sum tax TN A¯t on the old entrepreneur’s income.
• The government levies a lump-sum tax TwA¯t on the wage income.
When the central bank sets a nominal interest rate, the money growth rate z will be endogenous.
Equivalently, we can assume that the money growth rate is an exogenous policy instrument so that
the nominal interest rate is endogenous as in Sections 2 and 3. Our focus on the interest rate
policy is consistent with the practice in many countries and also with the dynamic new Keynesian
literature. Notice that here money increments are transferred to entrepreneurs instead of savers
unlike in the model of Section 2. In the appendix we show that savers’ money demand decreases
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with the nominal interest rate Rft and the saving demand increases with Rft, instead of the real
interest rate. This property allows money to be not super-neutral.
We first show that monetary policy alone can achieve the efficient innovation and R&D invest-
ment, but cannot achieve production and consumption efficiency.
Assumption 2 The parameter values are such that
λ (1− α) ζ
1 + g
(1 + g)F (nFB)
g + F (nFB)
< nFB <
[
λ+ (1− λ) β + γ
1 + β + γ
]
(1− α) ζ
1 + g
(1 + g)F (nFB)
g + F (nFB)
and
ψF ′ (nFB)
1 + g
> 1 +
γ
β
. (36)
Assumption 2 ensures that on the balance growth path the efficient level of R&D investment
cannot be self-financed by the entrepreneur’s wage income alone but can be financed by the en-
trepreneur’s wage income plus savers’ total savings. Moreover, the marginal return to the R&D
investment must be sufficiently high. Thus monetary transfers and external credit are needed. We
are interested in whether a particular monetary policy can ensure savers’ savings are efficiently
channeled to entrepreneurs through the credit market.
The restriction on γ in (36) is a sufficient condition to ensure that the monetary transfers
combined with the entrepreneur’s wage income are not sufficient for entrepreneurs to finance the
efficient level of the R&D investment. Thus external debt is needed through the credit market. If
γ is too large, then the savers’ money demand would be large enough so that the government can
transfer a sufficient amount of money to the entrepreneurs and the credit market is not needed. In
this paper we will not consider this uninteresting case.
Proposition 5 Suppose that money increments are transferred to young entrepreneurs and there
is no fiscal policy. Under Assumption 2, there exists a nominal interest rate R¯f > 1 + γ/β such
that the market equilibrium under a perfect credit market achieves the efficient R&D investment
nFB along the balanced growth path with the productivity growth rate being g.
The intuition for this result can be seen from the equilibrium optimality condition for innovation
or R&D investment, (18). The central bank can choose a particular nominal interest rate (or money
growth rate) such that the private optimality condition coincides with the efficient optimality
condition for innovation along a balanced growth path.
In the appendix we show that for any given µt−1 the efficient output level is higher than
the market equilibrium level because of the monopoly distortion. Monetary policy alone cannot
correct this inefficiency. We thus need fiscal policy. To achieve efficient output, the government can
subsidize the final good firm’s input expenditure by a suitable choice of tax credit 1− τxt (i).
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Since innovators or entrepreneurs are monopolists and face credit constraints, this causes in-
efficiency in innovation. To correct this inefficiency, the government can subsidize entrepreneurs’
profits at rate τN and transfer money increments τet to young entrepreneurs.
Since there are overlapping generations of agents in the economy, the consumption allocation
within and across generations in a market equilibrium may not be efficient. The government can
levy lump-sum taxes TN A¯t and TwA¯t on (or make lump-sum transfers to) entrepreneurs and savers,
keeping the government budget balanced in the meantime.
The following result shows that the economy can achieve efficient innovation, production, and
consumption by a suitable choice of the above monetary and fiscal policy tools.
Proposition 6 Suppose that money increments are transferred to young entrepreneurs. Then un-
der Assumption 3 given in the appendix the steady-state efficient innovation and allocation can be
implemented by the competitive equilibrium with a perfect credit market along a balanced growth
path under the monetary and fiscal policy tools R0f , τ
0
xt (i) , τ
0
et, τ
0
N , T
0
N , and T
0
w described in the
appendix.
The intuition behind the proposition is that we set the nominal interest rate such that the real
interest rate is given by the efficient rate in (35). At this rate we ensure intertemporal efficiency so
that cyt = c
o
t . The implied money growth rate z
0 and inflation rate Π0 in the steady state satisfy
z0 = βR0f − 1, Π0 =
1 + z0
1 + g
.
Moreover, the subsidy rate τ0N ensures that it is optimal for the entrepreneur to choose the efficient
level of innovation. Finally, the taxes or transfers T 0N and T
0
w ensure that within generation con-
sumption allocation is efficient (cet = c
y
t = c
o
t ) and that the government budget balances. Notice
that the signs of T 0N and T
0
w are ambiguous and they may be either interpreted as taxes or subsidies.
We impose Assumption 3, similar to Assumption 2, to ensure that a nontrivial market equi-
librium exists given the specific monetary and fiscal policy tools described in Proposition 6. Since
this assumption is technical, we present it in the appendix.
5.2 Binding Credit Constraints
When the credit constraint binds so that the credit market is imperfect, the government should
improve credit markets to raise κ by imposing better creditor protection and better contract en-
forcement. If we take κ as given, we can introduce another policy instrument to overcome the credit
constraint. Once the credit constraint is slack, we then use the policy tools studied in the previous
subsection to achieve the efficient allocation.
Specifically, consider the case of κ < κ0, where κ0 is defined in equation (A.62) in the appendix.
Then the credit constraint binds and the policies described in Proposition 6 cannot achieve ef-
ficiency. Suppose that the government can make direct lending Dt at the nominal interest rate
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Rft to the young entrepreneur. Suppose that the government has better monitoring abilities than
private agents so that the entrepreneur cannot hide or divert the government funds. Then the
credit constraint only applies to Nt−Dt. The government finances the loans by levying lump-sum
taxes on the young saver and then makes transfer DtRft to the old saver. In this case the saver’s
consumption and portfolio choices are not affected.
To implement the efficient allocation along the balanced growth path, we suppose Dt = DA¯t+1
and set D at a value higher than the expression below:[
(1 + g) ηFB
1 + g − κ0 −
(1 + g) ηFB
1 + g − κ
][
λ+
βR0f − 1
βR0f
1− λ
1 + β + γ
γ (1 + g)
1 + g − β
]
,
where ηFB is given in the appendix. Then the credit constraint is slack at the equilibrium allocation
and interest rate R0f described in Proposition 6. Now we can apply the analysis in Section 5.1 and
Proposition 6 to achieve the efficient allocation.
6 Conclusion
An important feature of developing countries is that credit markets are imperfect due to reasons
such as weak contract enforcement, weak creditor protection, and agency issues. We follow AHM
(2005) and incorporate this feature into a Schumpeterian overlapping-generations model of economic
growth to explain convergence and divergence. Our contribution is to introduce money and study
how monetary and fiscal policies can achieve efficient allocation in a market equilibrium. We find
that how money increments are transferred to agents is important for their long-run impact on
economic growth. When money increments are transferred to agents in an amount proportional
to their pre-transfer holdings, money is super-neutral. For a sufficiently low level of financial
development, the economy can enter a poverty trap with low economic growth and high inflation.
When money increments are transferred to young entrepreneurs, to whom money is most needed,
it is not super-neutral. Monetary policy affects the real economy through a redistribution channel.
The government should first improve credit market conditions so that entrepreneurs are not credit
constrained. Then there is a combination of monetary and fiscal policies such that the economy
can avoid the poverty trap and achieve efficient allocation. In this case the economy will grow at
a faster rate for some period of time and then gradually converge to the same rate as the world
frontier.
One limitation of our model is that we have assumed that the world frontier technology grows at
an exogenously given constant rate. In the future research, it is desirable to relax this assumption
and treat the technological innovation as endogenously determined in both advanced countries and
developing countries. In the new setup, a developing country with well-functioning financial mar-
ket, appropriate fiscal and monetary policies, and the advantage of backwardness in technological
innovation, may achieve absolute convergence and become an advanced country.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: We first study the steady state. Using equations (18), (19), (20), and
(21) and setting zt = z, we derive a system of four steady-state equations
Rf =
1 + z
1 + g
F ′(n)ψ, (A.1)
a =
(1 + g)F (n)
g + F (n)
, (A.2)
n =
(1− α) ζa
1 + g
{
λ+
(1− λ)
1 + β + γ
[
β − γ
Rf/ (1 + z)− 1
]}
, (A.3)
and Π = (1 + z) / (1 + g) to determine four steady-state variables Rf , a, n, and Π.
From these equations, we show that n is determined by the equation
n =
(1− α) ζF (n)
g + F (n)
{
λ+
(1− λ)
1 + β + γ
[
β − γ
F ′(n)ψ/ (1 + g)− 1
]}
.
Equivalently, it follows from n = Φ (µ) and F = Φ−1 that µ is determined by the equation
Φ′ (µ) =
ψ
Rf/Π
, (A.4)
where
Rf
Π
= (1 + g)
1 + γβ − [Φ(µ)(g+µ)(1−α)ζµ − λ] 1+β+γ1−λ

and Π = (1 + z) / (1 + g) . Since Φ′′ > 0, Φ′ > 0, and Φ (0) = 0, we can check that Φ (µ) (g + µ) /µ
decreases with µ. Thus the real interest rate Rf/Π is decreasing in µ and Φ
′ (µ) is increasing in
µ. Given conditions (22) and (23), it follows from the intermediate value theorem that there is a
unique solution µ∗ ∈ (0, 1) to (A.4).10 The associated R&D investment is given by n∗ = Φ (µ∗) and
hence R∗f and a
∗ are determined by (A.1) and (A.2). We also assume that the condition
R∗f
1 + z
> 1 +
γ
β
(A.5)
is satisfied so that (12) holds along the balanced growth path. We will verify later that this condition
is indeed satisfied in the proof of Proposition 2.
Using (A.3) and (15), we can rewrite the credit constraint (6) along a balanced growth path as
n
(
βRf
Π
− κ
)
≤ βRf
Π
λ (1− α) ζa
1 + g
.
10We do not consider the knife-edge case of boundary solutions.
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The critical value of κ such that the credit constraint just binds in the steady-state equilibrium is
given by
κ∗ =
βR∗f
Π
[
1− λ (1− α) ζa
∗
n∗ (1 + g)
]
. (A.6)
When κ > κ∗, the credit constraint does not bind. It follows from (A.4) that money supply does not
affect the equilibrium innovation rate µ∗. An increase in the money growth rate raises the nominal
interest rate one for one and hence does not affect savings. Thus the supply of funds for innovation
does not depend on monetary policy.
Next we study local dynamics. By defining rt ≡ Rft/ (1 + zt+1) and eliminating Rft/Πt+1, we
can reduce the equilibrium system (18), (19), (20), and (21) to three equations
at+1 = F (nt) +
1− F (nt)
1 + g
at, (A.7)
rt − 1 = F ′(nt)ψ at
at+1 (1 + g)
rt+1 − 1
rt+1
, (A.8)
nt =
(1− α) ζat
1 + g
[
λ+
(1− λ)
1 + β + γ
(
β − γ
rt − 1
)]
(A.9)
for three variables at, nt, and rt. Assume that zt is constant over time.
Log-linearizing the above equations around the steady state yields
aˆt+1 =
g
1 + g
nF ′(n)
F (n)
nˆt +
1− F (n)
1 + g
aˆt,
rˆt =
(r − 1)
r
[
F ′′(n)n
F ′(n)
nˆt − g
1 + g
nF ′(n)
F (n)
nˆt +
g + F (n)
1 + g
aˆt
]
+
1
r
rˆt+1,
nˆt = aˆt +
(1−λ)
1+β+γγ
r
(r−1)2
λ+ (1−λ)1+β+γ
(
β − γr−1
) rˆt ≡ aˆt + ϑrˆt, (A.10)
where a variable without time subscript denotes the steady state value and a variable with a hat
denotes the log deviation from the steady state. It follows from condition (A.5) that ϑ > 0.
Eliminating nˆt yields a system of two linear difference equations[
aˆt+1
rˆt+1
]
= J
[
aˆt
rˆt
]
, (A.11)
where
J ≡
 g1+g nF ′(n)F (n) + 1−F (n)1+g ϑ g1+g nF ′(n)F (n)
(1− r)
[
1− g1+g nF
′(n)
F (n) − 1−F (n)1+g + F
′′(n)n
F ′(n)
]
r + (r − 1)ϑ
[
g
1+g
nF ′(n)
F (n) − F
′′(n)n
F ′(n)
]  .
We now study the eigenvalues of J to determine the local stability of the equilibrium system.
Consider the quadratic characteristic equation
G (ν) = |J − νI| = 0.
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After a tedious calculation we obtain
G(0) =
[
g
1 + g
nF ′(n)
F (n)
+
1− F (n)
1 + g
]
r − 1− F (n)
1 + g
(r − 1)ϑF
′′(n)n
F ′(n)
+ϑ
g
1 + g
nF ′(n)
F (n)
(r − 1), (A.12)
and
G(1) =
[
g
1 + g
nF ′(n)
F (n)
+
1− F (n)
1 + g
− 1
]
(r − 1)
[
1− F
′′(n)n
F ′(n)
]
+ϑ
g
1 + g
nF ′(n)
F (n)
(r − 1)ϑF
′′(n)n
F ′(n)
. (A.13)
Under conditions (24), (A.5), F ′ > 0, and F ′′ < 0, we can check that G (0) > 0 and G (1) < 0.
It follows from the intermediate value theorem that there exists an eigenvalue ν1 ∈ (0, 1) such that
G (ν1) = 0. Since lim x→∞G(x) = ∞, it follows from the intermediate value theorem that there
exists another eigenvalue ν2 > 1 such that G (ν2) = 0. We conclude that the steady state is a saddle
point.
[Insert Figure 6 Here.]
Finally we study transition dynamics. We set zt = z for all t for simplicity. Then we can write
the log-linearized equilibrium solution as
aˆt+1 = φaaˆt, rˆt = Rˆft = φraˆt, nˆt = φnaˆt, rˆft = φrraˆt, and Πˆt+1 = φΠaˆt,
where rft ≡ Rft/Πt+1 denotes the real interest rate. We want to determine the signs of all the
coefficients. We first use the phase diagram in Figure 6 to determine the signs of φa and φr. By
(A.11) the locus aˆt+1 = aˆt represents the equation
rˆt =
1− g1+g nF
′(n)
F (n) − 1−F (n)1+g
ϑ g1+g
nF ′(n)
F (n)
aˆt, (A.14)
which has a positive slope by condition (24). The locus rˆt+1 = rˆt represents the equation
rt =
1− g1+g nF
′(n)
F (n) − 1−F (n)1+g + F
′′(n)n
F ′(n)
1 + ϑ[ g1+g
nF ′(n)
F (n) − F
′′(n)n
F ′(n) ]
aˆt. (A.15)
Since F ′′ < 0 and F ′ > 0, the slope of this line may be either positive or negative. The left panel of
Figure 6 plots the case in which the locus rˆt+1 = rˆt is negative. We can see that, if aˆ1 < 0, namely
if the initial value a1 is below the steady state, the interest rate rˆt declines but at increases over
time to their steady-state values along the saddle path. We now turn to case in which the slope
of the locus rˆt+1 = rˆt is positive, illustrated in the right panel of Figure 6. We can show that the
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slope of the locus aˆt+1 = aˆt is greater than the slope of the locus rˆt+1 = rˆt. We can see that, if
the initial value a1 is below the steady state, rt and at both increase over time, approaching their
steady-state values.
In summary we have shown that φa ∈ (0, 1) and φr can be either positive or negative. Up to
the first order approximation, the productivity growth satisfies
logAt+1 − logAt = aˆt+1 − aˆt + log(1 + g) = (φa − 1)aˆt + log(1 + g).
Thus, when a1 is slightly below the steady state, the productivity growth is positive and decreases
to the steady state. By nˆt = aˆt + ϑrˆt, we have φn = 1 + ϑφr. If φr > 0, then we have φn > 0 since
ϑ > 0. In the case of φr < 0 as in the left panel of Figure 6, we see that the saddle path is flatter
than the locus rt+1 = rt. Namely we must have
φr >
1− g1+g nF
′(n)
F (n) − 1−F (n)1+g + F
′′(n)n
F ′(n)
1 + ϑ[ g1+g
nF ′(n)
F (n) − F
′′(n)n
F ′(n) ]
.
This implies that
φn = 1 + ϑφr > 1 + ϑ
1− g1+g nF
′(n)
F (n) − 1−F (n)1+g + F
′′(n)n
F ′(n)
1 + ϑ[ g1+g
nF ′(n)
F (n) − F
′′(n)n
F ′(n) ]
=
1 + ϑg+F (n)1+g
1 + ϑ
[
g
1+g
nF ′(n)
F (n) − F
′′(n)n
F ′(n)
] > 0,
where the inequality follows from F ′ > 0, F ′′ < 0, and ϑ > 0. Thus, as at increases to the steady
state, nt will do so too. Since µt = F (nt) and F
′ > 0, µt also increases to the steady state.
Log-linearizing equation (18) yields
r̂ft =
nF ′′(n)
F ′(n)
nˆt =
nF ′′(n)
F ′(n)
φnaˆt ≡ φrraˆt.
It follows from F ′′ < 0, F ′ > 0, and φn > 0 that φrr < 0. Thus as at increases to the steady state,
the real interest rate rft decreases to the steady state. Finally, log-linearizing equation (20) given
zt = z for all t yields
Πˆt+1 = aˆt − aˆt+1 − 1
r − 1(rˆt − rˆt+1) = (1− φa)aˆt −
1
r − 1(1− φa)φraˆt
= (1− φa)
(
1− 1
r − 1φr
)
aˆt ≡ φΠaˆt.
If φr < 0, then we have φΠ > 0. If φr > 0, we use the equation
Πˆt+1 = rˆt − r̂ft = (φr − φrr) aˆt ≡ φΠaˆt
to deduce φΠ > 0. In both cases, Πt increases with at to the steady state. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2: The equilibrium system consists of equations (19), (20), (21), and (25).
First we study the steady state, in which the equilibrium system becomes (A.2), (A.3), and the
following equation
λ+
1− λ
1 + β + γ
[
β − γ
Rf/ (1 + z)− 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
supply
=
λβRf/Π
βRf/Π− κ︸ ︷︷ ︸
limit
, (A.16)
where Π = (1 + z) / (1 + g) . The expression on the left-hand side of equation (A.16) is increasing
in Rf and the expression on the right-hand side is decreasing in Rf . When Rf/ (1 + z) = 1 + γ/β,
the credit supply takes the value λ, which is below the borrowing limit when βRf/Π−κ > 0. When
Rf →∞, the credit supply approaches λ+ (1−λ)β1+β+γ , which is higher than the credit limit λ. Thus by
the intermediate value theorem there is a unique solution for Rf to equation (A.16) such that
Rf
1 + z
> max
{
1 +
γ
β
,
κΠ
β (1 + z)
}
. (A.17)
Let R∗∗f denote the solution. Using equations (A.3), (A.2) and (A.16), we derive that
n =
λ (1− α) ζF (n)
g + F (n)
βR∗∗f /Π
βR∗∗f /Π− κ
.
We can equivalently rewrite this equation in terms of µ as
Φ (µ) (g + µ) =
(1− α) ζλβR∗∗f /Π
βR∗∗f /Π− κ
µ. (A.18)
Notice that there is a trivial solution µ = 0 to the above equation since Φ (0) = 0. We rule out this
solution by the following condition:
Φ′ (0) g <
(1− α) ζλβR∗∗f /Π
βR∗∗f /Π− κ
< Φ (1) (g + 1) . (A.19)
Then it follows from the intermediate value theorem that there is a unique solution, denoted
by µ∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) , to equation (A.18). The corresponding R&D investment level is denoted by
n∗∗ = Φ (µ∗∗) > 0.
Define the critical values κ∗∗ and κ¯ for κ such that
Φ′ (0) g =
(1− α) ζλβR∗∗f /Π
βR∗∗f /Π− κ∗∗
,
(1− α) ζλβR∗∗f /Π
βR∗∗f /Π− κ¯
= Φ (1) (g + 1) .
where R∗∗f is the solution to equation (A.16) and is a function of κ. We can verify that the expression
R∗∗f /Π
R∗∗f /Π− κ
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increases with κ along the supply curve in Figure 3. Thus the values κ∗∗ and κ¯ are unique. When
κ∗∗ < κ < κ¯, condition (A.19) holds.
From Figure 3, we can see that the unconstrained equilibrium interest rate under perfect credit
market is higher than that under binding credit constraint. Thus (A.17) and hence (22) and (A.5)
must hold for the unconstrained equilibrium. If κ∗∗ < κ < min {κ∗, κ¯} , then the unconstraint
equilibrium derived in Proposition 1 violates the credit constraint and condition (A.19) is satisfied.
For (26) to hold, we need
ψF ′ (n∗∗) >
R∗∗f
Π
.
Since (A.1) holds at n∗ and R∗f and since n
∗∗ < n∗ and R∗∗f < R
∗
f , the above condition follows
from the concavity of F . The rest of the proof follows from the analysis in the main text using
Figure 3. In particular, an increase in κ raises the nominal interest rate R∗∗f and hence raises n
∗∗
by combining equations (A.3) and (A.2). It also raises the corresponding a∗∗ by (A.2). But there
is no growth effect because the economy still grows at the rate g on the balanced growth path.
Next we study the local stability. As in the proof of Proposition 1, we rewrite the equilibrium
system (19), (20), (21), and (25) as
at+1 = F (nt) +
1− F (nt)
1 + g
at, (A.20)
rt − 1 = Rft
Πt+1
(rt+1 − 1)
rt+1
at
at+1 (1 + g)
, (A.21)
nt =
(1− α) ζat
1 + g
[
λ+
(1− λ)
1 + β + γ
(
β − γ
rt − 1
)]
, (A.22){
λ+
(1− λ)
1 + β + γ
[
β − γ
rt − 1
]}
=
βRft/Πt+1
βRft/Πt+1 − κλ. (A.23)
Define rft ≡ Rft/Πt+1. Log-linearizing this system yields
aˆt+1 =
g
1 + g
nF ′(n)
F (n)
nˆt +
1− F (n)
1 + g
aˆt,
r
r − 1 rˆt = rˆft +
1
r − 1 rˆt+1 + aˆt − aˆt+1,
nˆt = aˆt + ϑrˆt,
rˆft = −ϑ(βRf/Π− κ)
κ
rˆt ≡ −%rˆt, (A.24)
where ϑ is given in (A.10). Notice that %, ϑ > 0 by condition (A.17).
Simplifying yields a system of two equations for aˆt and rˆt :[
aˆt+1
rˆt+1
]
=
 g1+g nF ′(n)F (n) + 1−F (n)1+g ϑ g1+g nF ′(n)F (n)
(1− r)
[
1− g1+g nF
′(n)
F (n) − 1−F (n)1+g
]
r + (r − 1)[ϑ g1+g nF
′(n)
F (n) + %]
[ aˆt
rˆt
]
≡ J
[
aˆt
rˆt
]
(A.25)
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Consider the quadratic characteristic equation G (ν) ≡ |J − νI| = 0. We can check that G (0) > 0
and G (1) < 0 by condition (27). Moreover limx→∞G (x) =∞ As in the proof of Proposition 1, we
deduce that there is an eigenvalue inside the unit circle and an eigenvalue outside the unit circle.
Thus the steady state is a saddle point.
[Insert Figure 7 Here.]
Finally we study transition dynamics using the phase diagram in Figure 7. The locus at+1 = at
represents the line
rˆt =
1− g1+g nF
′(n)
F (n) − 1−F (n)1+g
ϑ g1+g
nF ′(n)
F (n)
aˆt,
and the locus rt+1 = rt represents the line
rˆt =
1− g1+g nF
′(n)
F (n) − 1−F (n)1+g
1 + ϑ g1+g
nF ′(n)
F (n) + %
aˆt.
Notice that both lines have a positive slope and the locus rˆt+1 = rˆt is flatter than the locus
aˆt+1 = aˆt. Thus, if the initial value aˆ1 < 0, then both rˆt and aˆt will increase over time to their
steady-state values.
We now examine the dynamics of other variables. As in the proof of Proposition 1, we only
need to study the signs of coefficients φrr, φn, and φΠ. Since Rft = rt(1 + z) and z is constant, Rft
increases over time as at increases over time given initial aˆ1 < 0. Since nˆt = aˆt + ϑrˆt ≡ φnaˆt and
φn > 0, as both aˆt and rˆt increase overtime, so does nˆt. Since
rˆft = −ϑ(βRf/Π− κ)
κ
rˆt ≡ −%rˆt = −%φraˆt ≡ φrraˆt,
we have φrr < 0. Thus the real interest rate Rft/Πt+1 decreases with at to the steady state. The
growth rate of the economy up to the first-order approximation is given by
logAt+1 − logAt = aˆt+1 − aˆt + log(1 + g) = (φa − 1)aˆt + log(1 + g).
It follows from φa ∈ (0, 1) that the growth rate of the economy declines as at increases. It follows
from
Πˆt+1 = rˆt − rˆft = (φr − φrr)aˆt ≡ φΠaˆt,
φr > 0, and φrr < 0 that the inflation rate Πt increases with at to the steady state. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: The equilibrium system still consists of equations (19), (20), (21), and
(25). We first study the steady state which is characterized by equations (A.3), (A.2), (A.16), and
Π =
1 + z
1 + g
lim
t→∞
at
at+1
. (A.26)
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Notice that at may not converge to a positive constant when 0 < κ < κ
∗∗. As in the proof of
Proposition 2, equation (A.18) still holds. But when κ ∈ (0, κ∗∗) , the first inequality in assumption
(A.19) is violated so that the following inequality holds in the steady state:
Φ′ (0) g >
(1− α) ζλβRf/Π
βRf/Π− κ . (A.27)
Thus the only solution to equation (A.18) is µp = 0. As a result, we have np = ap = 0 in the steady
state.
The following algebra shows that the productivity growth will converge to a rate between 0 and
1 + g for κ < κ∗∗ :
lim
t→∞
At+1
At
= (1 + g) lim
t→∞
at+1
at
= (1 + g) lim
t→∞
(
µt
at
+
1− µt
1 + g
)
= (1 + g) lim
t→∞
F (nt)
at
+ 1 = (1 + g) lim
a→0
F (n)
a
+ 1
= (1 + g)F ′ (0)
∂n
∂a
|a→0 + 1 = F ′ (0) (1− α) ζλβRf/Π
βRf/Π− κ + 1
< F ′ (0) Φ′ (0) g + 1 = g + 1,
where we have used equations (A.3) and (A.16) and µt → 0 to derive the second last equality. The
last inequality holds because (A.27) holds. By (A.26) and the above expression for lim
t→∞
at+1
at
, the
steady-state inflation rate satisfies
Π =
1 + z
F ′ (0) (1−α)ζλβRf/ΠβRf/Π−κ + 1
>
1 + z
1 + g
. (A.28)
The poverty-trap steady state is characterized by a system of two equations (A.16) and (A.28) for
two variables Rf and Π.
We modify Figure 3 to show the existence of a unique solution denoted by Πp and Rpf . Now
the horizontal axis shows the real interest rate Rf/Π instead of the nominal interest rate Rf . The
borrowing-limit curve still describes the expression on the right-hand side of equation (A.16) as a
decreasing function of Rf/Π. The supply curve describes the expression on the left-hand side of
(A.16), which is written as a function Rf/Π :
λ+
1− λ
1 + β + γ
[
β − γ
Rf
Π
Π
1+z − 1
]
= λ+
1− λ
1 + β + γ
β − γ
Rf
Π
(
F ′ (0) (1−α)ζλβRf/ΠβRf/Π−κ + 1
)−1 − 1
 ,
where we have used (A.28) to substitute for Π. We can check that the above expression increases
with Rf/Π. As in the proof of Proposition 2, there is a unique intersection point between the
borrowing-limit and supply curves such that (A.17) holds, which determines the equilibrium real
interest rate Rf/Π. Then Π
p and Rpf are determined.
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It follows from (A.28) that Πp > (1 + z) / (1 + g) and Πp decreases with κ as
λβRf/Π
βRf/Π−κ increases
with κ (see Figure 3). Similarly, lim
t→∞At+1/At increases with κ.
Next we study the local stability of the poverty trap steady state. The equilibrium system is
still given by equations (A.20) through (A.23). Since the steady-state values of nt and at are zero,
we cannot use log-linearization. Instead we use linearization in levels to derive
F (nt) = F (0) + F
′(0)nt = F ′(0)nt.
Substituting this equation into (19) yields
at+1 = F
′(0)nt +
1− F ′(0)nt
1 + g
at (A.29)
Combining equations (21) and (25) yields
nt =
(1− α) ζat
1 + g
λβRft/Πt+1
βRft/Πt+1 − κ.
Linearizing around the steady state yields
nt =
(1− α) ζ
1 + g
λβRf/Π
βRf/Π− κat. (A.30)
Substituting this equation into (A.29), we obtain the approximate law of motion for at :
at+1 =
{
F ′(0)
(1− α) ζ
1 + g
λβRf/Π
βRf/Π− κ +
1
1 + g
}
at − F
′(0)
1 + g
(1− α) ζ
1 + g
λβRf/Π
βRf/Π− κa
2
t . (A.31)
We have shown earlier that
0 < F ′(0)
(1− α) ζ
1 + g
λβRf/Π
βRf/Π− κ +
1
1 + g
< 1,
when κ ∈ (0, κ∗∗) . It follows from (A.31) that at decreases monotonically to the steady state ap = 0
whenever it starts at any small a1 > 0. Thus the steady state is a saddle point. It follows from
(A.30) that nt also decreases monotonically to the steady state n
p = 0. Since µt = F (nt) , µt also
decreases monotonically to the steady state µp = 0.
We can derive the approximate productivity growth rate around the steady state
At+1
At
− 1 = at+1
at
(1 + g)− 1
= F ′(0) (1− α) ζ λβRf/Π
βRf/Π− κ − F
′(0)
(1− α) ζ
1 + g
λβRf/Π
βRf/Π− κat, (A.32)
where the second equality follows from substitution of (A.31). Since F ′ (0) > 0 and λβRf/ΠβRf/Π−κ > 0,
the productivity growth rate increases to the steady state when at decreases to the steady state.
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We log-linearize equation (A.21) to derive
r
r − 1 rˆt = rˆft +
1
r − 1 rˆt+1 + xˆt (A.33)
where we define rft = Rft/Πt+1 and
xt ≡ at
at+1
=
1
F ′(0) (1−α)ζ1+g
[
βRf/Π
βRf/Π−κλ
]
+ 11+g − F
′(0)
1+g
(1−α)ζ
1+g
λβRf/Π
βRf/Π−κat
.
Here the second equality follows from equation (A.31). We then obtain the log-linearized equation
xˆt =
F ′(0) (1−α)ζ1+g
λβRf/Π
βRf/Π−κ
F ′(0) (1− α) ζ λβRf/ΠβRf/Π−κ + 1
at ≡ φxat.
Substituting (A.24) into (A.33) yields
rˆt =
1
r + (r − 1)%rˆt+1 +
r − 1
r + (r − 1)%xˆt. (A.34)
We now drop the quadratic term in (A.31) and write the first-order approximation to the law of
motion as at+1 = φaat, where φa ∈ (0, 1) . Since r = Rf/ (1 + z) > 1 and % > 0 by (A.17), we
iterate (A.34) forward to derive
rˆt =
(r − 1)φx
r + (r − 1)%− φaat.
Thus, as at decreases to the steady state, rˆt also decreases to the steady state and so does Rft. It
follows from (A.24) and % > 0 that the real interest rate rft = Rft/Πt+1 increases to the steady
state when rˆt or Rft decreases to the steady state. Finally, since
Πˆt+1 = rˆt − rˆft = (1 + %)rˆt,
the inflation rate Πt decreases to the steady state when rˆt decreases to the steady state. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Let βtΛt and β
tΛtqt be the Lagrange multipliers associated with (32)
and (13), respectively. The variable qt represents the shadow value of the technology At+1. The
first-order conditions are given by
ωu′ (cet ) = u
′ (cot ) = u
′ (cyt ) = Λt,
Λt = βΛt+1(
1
α
− 1)
[
α
1
1−α A¯t+1 −
(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
χAt
]
F ′
(
Nt/A¯t+1
)
A¯t+1
+Λtqt[A¯t+1 −At]
F ′
(
Nt/A¯t+1
)
A¯t+1
,
Λtqt = β(1− µt+1)Λt+1qt+1 + β2Λt+2(1− µt+1)( 1
α
− 1)
(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
χ.
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In the steady state, we have
q =
β
1 + g
(1− µ)q +
(
β
1 + g
)2
(1− µ)( 1
α
− 1)
(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
χ,
and
1
F ′ (n)
= β
1
1 + g
(
1
α
− 1)
[
α
1
1−α −
(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
χ
a
1 + g
]
+ q
[
1− a
1 + g
]
.
Equation (13) implies
a =
F (n) (1 + g)
g + F (n)
. (A.35)
Using the above three equations we can derive
1
F ′ (n)
=
β
1 + g
(
1
α
− 1)
[
α
1
1−α −
(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
χ
]
+
β
1 + g − β(1− F (n))(
1
α
− 1)
(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
χ
g
g + F (n)
.
This equation is equivalent to equation (34). We can easily check that the expression on the
left-hand side of the equation is an increasing function of µ and the expression on the right-hand
side is a decreasing function of µ. Given Assumption 1, it follows from the intermediate value
theorem that there is a unique solution, denoted by µFB ∈ (0, 1) , to the above equation. Then we
obtain the efficient investment level nF = Φ (µFB) . Plugging it into (A.35) gives aFB. The efficient
consumption and production allocation is derived in the main text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose that there is no fiscal policy. When money increments are
transferred to entrepreneurs instead of savers, the saver’s consumption and portfolio choices are
given by
cyt =
(1− λ)wt
1 + β + γ
, (A.36)
cot+1 =
β
1 + β + γ
Rft
Πt+1
(1− λ)wt, (A.37)
Mt
Pt
=
γ
1 + β + γ
Rft
Rft − 1(1− λ)wt, (A.38)
St
Pt
=
1
1 + β + γ
βRft − β − γ
Rft − 1 (1− λ)wt, (A.39)
where we assume that
Rft > 1 +
γ
β
,
so that savings and money demand are positive. Notice that the demand for money and savings
depends on the nominal interest rate instead of the real interest rate. The monetary transfer is
given by
Mt −Mt−1
Pt
=
zt
zt + 1
Mt
Pt
=
zt
zt + 1
γ
1 + β + γ
Rft
Rft − 1(1− λ)wt,
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where the second equality follows from (A.38).
The competitive equilibrium for a given interest rate sequence {Rft} under perfect credit mar-
kets can be summarized by a system of four difference equations, (18), (19), (20), and
nt =
(1− α) ζat
1 + g
[
λ+
zt
1 + zt
(1− λ)
1 + β + γ
γRft
Rft − 1 +
(1− λ)
1 + β + γ
βRft − β − γ
Rft − 1
]
. (A.40)
for four sequences {zt}, {at} , {Πt+1}, and {nt} such that (6) and Rft > 1 + γ/β are satisfied.
Equation (A.40) says that R&D investment is financed by the entrepreneur’s wage income, monetary
transfer, and external credit.
In the steady state the system becomes three equations (A.1), (A.2), and
n =
(1− α) ζa
1 + g
[
λ+
z
1 + z
(1− λ)
1 + β + γ
γRf
Rf − 1 +
(1− λ)
1 + β + γ
βRf − β − γ
Rf − 1
]
, (A.41)
for three unknowns n, z, and a, when the nominal interest rate Rf is set by the monetary authority.
Given the efficient innovation rate µFB, we have nFB = Φ (µFB) , and
aFB =
(1 + g)F (nFB)
g + F (nFB)
.
We now show that the monetary authority can set a specific nominal interest rate such that the
efficient innovation can be implemented in a market equilibrium with a perfect credit market on
the balanced growth path. Specifically, using the steady-state system, we can derive one equation
for one unknown Rf :
nFB =
(1− α) ζaFB
1 + g
[
λ+
(1− λ)
1 + β + γ
(γ + β) (Rf − 1)− γψF ′ (nFB) / (1 + g)
Rf − 1
]
,
The expression on the right-hand side of the equation is an increasing function of Rf . Under
Assumption 2, this function takes a value lower than nFB at Rf = 1 + γ/β and a value higher
than nFB when Rf →∞. It follows from the intermediate value theorem that there exists a unique
solution, denoted by R¯f > 1+γ/β, to the above equation. Given Rf = R¯f , we can also easily show
that n = nFB is the only equilibrium solution.
Once R¯f is determined, we can solve for the money growth rate z using (A.1):
1 + z =
R¯f (1 + g)
F ′ (nFB)ψ
.
Other equilibrium variables can also be easily determined.
Finally we show that there exists a cutoff κ0 such that when κ ≥ κ0 the credit constraint does
not bind in the market equilibrium described above. The credit constraint is given by(
βRft
Πt+1
− κ
)
Nt ≤ βRft
Πt+1
[
λwt +
zt
1 + zt
γ (1− λ)
1 + β + γ
Rft
Rft − 1wt
]
,
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where the second term in the square bracket is the monetary transfer. In the steady state this
constraint becomes(
βRf
Π
− κ
)
n ≤ βRf
Π
(1− α) ζa
1 + g
[
λ+
z
1 + z
1− λ
1 + β + γ
γRf
Rf − 1
]
,
where we have used equation (15). The desired cutoff κ0 is defined by the following equation
nFB =
βR¯f (1 + g) / (1 + z)
βR¯f (1 + g) / (1 + z)− κ0
(1− α) ζaFB
1 + g
[
λ+
z
1 + z
1− λ
1 + β + γ
γR¯f
R¯f − 1
]
.
The proof is completed. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: First we show that for any given µt−1 the efficient GDP is higher than
the market GDP because of the monopoly distortion. To show this result, we observe that the
efficient GDP Y et is given by (31). By (17), the equilibrium GDP in the market economy is given
by
Yt = wt + µt−1ψA¯t
= (1− α)
(
α
χ
) α
1−α [
µt−1A¯t + (1− µt−1)At−1
]
+ (χ− 1)µt−1
(
α
χ
) 1
1−α
A¯t,
where we have substituted equations (13) and (15) and the expressions for ζ and ψ. We can easily
verify that Y et > Yt.
To achieve the efficient GDP, the government can subsidize the final good firm’s input expen-
diture. Let τxt(i) be the subsidy to input i in period t. Then the final good producer’s problem is
given by
max L1−αt
∫ 1
0
At (i)
1−α xt (i)α di−
∫ 1
0
τxt(i)pt(i)xt(i)di− wtLt.
This leads to
xt(i) =
(
τxt(i)pt (i)
α
) 1
α−1
At (i) . (A.42)
Since pt (i) = χ, it follows from (30) and (A.42) that setting
τxt(i) = τ
0
xt(i) ≡
{ 1
χ if an innovation occurs
1 otherwise
achieves the efficient intermediate input level and final GDP Y et .
In this case a successful innovator produces intermediate good xt (i) = α
1
1−α A¯t and earns
monopoly profits
pt (i)xt (i)− xt (i) = χα
1
1−α A¯t − α
1
1−α A¯t = ψ
∗A¯t,
where ψ∗ ≡ α 11−α (χ− 1) > ψ. Since the final good firm earns zero profit, the real wage under the
government policies is given by
wt = (1− α)
[
α
α
1−αµt−1A¯t + (1− µt−1)
(
α
χ
) α
1−α
At−1
]
. (A.43)
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The total subsidy is given by∫ 1
0
(1− τxt (i)) pt (i)xt (i) di = α
1
1−αµt−1A¯t(χ− 1).
Let wDt = wt − TwA¯t denote the after-tax wage. Since money increments are transferred to
entrepreneurs instead of savers, we rederive the saver’s decision rules as
cyt =
(1− λ)wDt
1 + β + γ
, (A.44)
cot+1 =
β
1 + β + γ
Rft
Πt+1
(1− λ)wDt, (A.45)
Mt
Pt
=
γ
1 + β + γ
Rft
Rft − 1(1− λ)wDt, (A.46)
St
Pt
=
1
1 + β + γ
βRft − β − γ
Rft − 1 (1− λ)wDt, (A.47)
where we assume that
Rft > 1 +
γ
β
,
so that savings and money demand are positive.
The entrepreneur’s budget constraint (4) when young becomes
Nt =
Bt
Pt
+ λwDt + τet, (A.48)
where τet is the monetary transfer
τet =
Mt −Mt−1
Pt
. (A.49)
The entrepreneur’s problem is to maximize his expected consumption when old:
max (1 + τN )F
(
Nt/A¯t+1
)
ψ∗A¯t+1 − TN A¯t+1 −Rft Pt
Pt+1
[Nt − λwDt − τ et ].
Suppose that the credit constraint is slack. The first-order condition implies that
(1 + τN )F
′(nt)ψ∗ = Rft
Pt
Pt+1
. (A.50)
By the market-clearing condition for loans and equations (A.46), (A.47), (A.48), and (A.49),
we derive that
Nt = λwDt +
zt
1 + zt
(1− λ)γ
1 + β + γ
Rft
Rft − 1wDt +
1− λ
1 + β + γ
βRft − β − γ
Rft − 1 wDt. (A.51)
The three terms on the right-hand side of this equation give three sources of funds for the R&D
investment: internal funds (wage), government monetary transfers, and external debt.
In the steady state equation (A.2) still holds and (A.50) becomes
(1 + τN )F
′(n)ψ∗ =
Rf
Π
, (A.52)
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where Π = (1 + z) / (1 + g) . Using (15) and (A.2), we rewrite (A.51) as
n = η
[
λ+
z
1 + z
(1− λ)
1 + β + γ
γRf
Rf − 1 +
1− λ
1 + β + γ
βRf − β − γ
Rf − 1
]
, (A.53)
where it follows from (A.43) that
η ≡ wDt
A¯t+1
= (1− α)
[
α
α
1−αµ
1 + g
+ (1− µ)
(
α
χ
) α
1−α a
(1 + g)2
]
− Tw
1 + g
(A.54)
is constant along a balanced growth path. The variable η represents the normalized after-tax wage
on the balanced growth path.
By (A.48), and (A.49), the credit constraint (5) becomes
Nt ≤ βRft/Πt+1
βRft/Πt+1 − κ
[
λwDt +
zt
1 + zt
γ (1− λ)
1 + β + γ
Rft
Rft − 1wDt
]
. (A.55)
In the steady state this constraint becomes
n ≤ ηβRf/Π
βRf/Π− κ
[
λ+
z
1 + z
1− λ
1 + β + γ
γRf
Rf − 1
]
, (A.56)
where we have used equation (??).
Since we do not consider government spending and government debt, the following government
budget constraint must be satisfied:
τNF
(
Nt−1/A¯t
)
ψ∗A¯t + α
1
1−αµt−1A¯t(χ− 1) + τet = TN A¯t + TwA¯t + Mt −Mt−1
Pt
,
where the second term represents the total subsidy to intermediate inputs. By (A.49), this con-
straint along a balanced growth path becomes
τNF (n)ψ
∗ + α
1
1−αµ(χ− 1) = TN + Tw. (A.57)
The steady-state competitive equilibrium under fiscal and monetary policy instruments {Rf , τx (i) ,
Tw, τN , TN} consists of four equations (A.2), (A.52), (A.53), and Π = (1 + z) / (1 + g) for four vari-
ables n, a, z, and Π such that (A.56) and (A.57) hold.11
We use (33) and ω = 1 to derive the efficient consumption for the young saver
cyt =
1
3
(Y et −Nt) .
To implement this efficient consumption in a market equilibrium, we use (A.44) to set the labor
income tax as
TwA¯t = wt − 1 + β + γ
3(1− λ) (Y
e
t −Nt) .
11During the transition path, we may use the interest rate rule
Rft = Rf
(
Πt
Π
)θ
.
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Using equations (15) and (31), we derive that
Tw =
[
1− 1 + β + γ
3(1− λ)
]
(1− α)
[
α
α
1−αµ+ (1− µ)
(
α
χ
) α
1−α a
(1 + g)
]
(A.58)
+
1 + β + γ
3(1− λ) (1 + g)n,
on the balanced growth path. We set TN such that the government budget constraint (A.57) is
satisfied.
It remains to choose τN and Rf such that the competitive equilibrium implies efficient produc-
tion and innovation such that a = aFB, n = nFB, and µ = F (nFB). We maintain the following
assumption similar to Assumption 2 such that the efficient R&D investment cannot be self-financed
by the entrepreneur’s wage income and monetary transfers and external credit are needed.
Assumption 3 Parameter values are such that 0 < γ < 1− β and
ληFB < nFB < ηFB
[
λ+
(1− λ) (β + γ)
1 + β + γ
]
,
where ηFB is defined in (A.54) and where Tw is defined in (A.58) with µ = µFB and a = aFB.
We now set policy variables R0f , τ
0
N , T
0
N , and T
0
w such that they satisfy
nFB = ηFB
λ+ 1− λ
1 + β + γ
β (γ + β)
(
R0f − 1
)
− γ
β
(
R0f − 1
)
 , (A.59)
τ0N =
(1 + g) /β
F ′(nFB)ψ∗
− 1, (A.60)
T 0N = τ
0
NF (nFB)ψ
∗ + α
1
1−αF (nFB) (χ− 1)− T 0w,
T 0w =
[
1− 1 + β + γ
3(1− λ)
]
(1− α)
[
α
α
1−αµFB + (1− µ)
(
α
χ
) α
1−α aFB
(1 + g)
]
(A.61)
+
1 + β + γ
3(1− λ) (1 + g)nFB.
As in the proof of Proposition 5, we use the intermediate value theorem to show that under
Assumption 3 there exists a unique solution for R0f > 1 + γ/β to equation (A.59).
Define the cutoff κ0 by the equation
nFB =
(1 + g) ηFB
1 + g − κ0
[
λ+
βR0f − 1
βR0f
1− λ
1 + β + γ
γ (1 + g)
1 + g − β
]
. (A.62)
Then when κ ≥ κ0 the credit constraint does not bind on the balanced growth path.
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Given the above monetary and fiscal policy variables, the steady-state system (A.2), (A.52),
(A.53), and Π = (1 + z) / (1 + g) becomes
a =
F (n) (1 + g)
g + F (n)
, Π =
1 + z
1 + g
,
F ′ (n)
F ′ (nFB)
=
R0f
Π
β
1 + g
,
n = η
[
λ+
z
1 + z
(1− λ)
1 + β + γ
γR0f
R0f − 1
+
1− λ
1 + β + γ
βR0f − β − γ
R0f − 1
]
,
for four variables n, a, µ, and z.
We can simplify this system to one equation for n :
n
η
= λ+
[
1− F
′ (n)
βR0fF
′ (nFB)
]
(1− λ)
1 + β + γ
γR0f
R0f − 1
+
1− λ
1 + β + γ
βR0f − β − γ
R0f − 1
, (A.63)
where
η =
1 + β + γ
3(1− λ)
(1− α)
α α1−αF (n)
1 + g
+ (1− F (n))
(
α
χ
) α
1−α
F (n)
(1 + g) (g + F (n))
− (1 + g)n
 .
We can check that n = nFB is a solution to equation (A.63). We next show that this is only
solution. Since F (n) is concave and F (0) = 0, we can show that F (n) /n decreases with n. Thus
η/n decreases with n or n/η increases with n. We also know that the expression on the right-hand
side of (A.63) increases with n. Two monotonic curves can only have one intersection point if there
is any. Thus there is a unique solution n = nFB to equation (A.63).
We can then verify that the solution to the above system is given by
a = aFB, n = nFB, z = βR
0
f − 1, Π =
βR0f
1 + g
.
Since the market real interest rate R0f/Π = β (1 + g) is the same as the efficient rate in (35), the old
saver consumption satisfies cot+1 = c
y
t (1 + g) . Thus c
o
t = c
y
t on the balanced growth path. We then
attain consumption efficiency by (33) with ω = 1. Since the above system has a unique solution,
the preceding solution is the only steady-state equilibrium that attains the efficient innovation,
production, and consumption allocation. Q.E.D.
B Data Description
For Figure 1 we follow Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) and AHM (2005) and consider cross-
sectional data on 71 countries over the period 1960–1995. As in their papers, we use private credit,
defined as the value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector, divided by GDP, as
our preferred measure of financial development. We construct this measure using the updated 2017
version of the Financial Development and Structure Database. We have also used other measures
40
of financial development and the pattern in Figure 1 does not change. We construct the average
per capita GDP growth rates using the Penn World Table and construct the average inflation rates
and the average (broad) money growth rates using the World Bank WDI database. We delete
outliers with average inflation rates higher than 40%, but the pattern in Figure 1 still holds for
the full sample. The outliers are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Israel, Peru, and Uruguay. The
non-convergence countries used in Panel D of Figure 1 are identified according to Table II of AHM
(2005).
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Figure 1: The average inflation rate, the average per capita GDP growth rate, the average money
growth rate, and the average level of financial development, 1960-1995.
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Figure 2: Transition dynamics for the case of perfect credit markets.
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Figure 3: Determination of the steady-state equilibrium nominal interest rates. The curves labeled
“Supply” and “Demand” describe the supply of and demand for funds normalized by the wage rate,
respectively. The curves labeled “Limit κ > κ∗” and “Limit κ > κ∗” describe the borrowing limits
normalized by the wage rate for κ > κ∗ and κ < κ∗, respectively.
47
0 200 400
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
t
0 200 400
1
1.005
1.01
1.015
1.02
t+1
0 200 400
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
at
0 200 400
1.079545
1.07955
1.079555
1.07956
1.079565
Rft
0 200 400
0.04
0.045
0.05
0.055
0.06
At+1/At-1
0 200 400
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
Rft/ t+1
Figure 4: Transition dynamics for the case of not too tight credit constraints.
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Figure 5: Transition dynamics for the case of poverty trap.
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Figure 6: Phase diagram for the case with perfect credit market.
Figure 7: Phase diagram for the case with not too tight credit constraint.
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